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RECENT CASES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Abortion • Parental and Spousal Consent
Requirements - Right to Privacy
Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 96 S.Ct. 2831 (1976).
T WO MISSOURI-LICENSED physicians and Planned Parenthood of Central
Missouri, a nonprofit corporation, originally brought this suit in U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri to challenge the constitu-
tionality of the Missouri abortion statute' (hereinafter referred to as the Act).
Striking as "overbroad" only that portion of the Act which would have
required physicians to attempt to save an aborted fetus' life at any stage of
pregnancy,2 the district court upheld the sections of the statute which re-
quired that during the first 12 weeks of pregnancy, a married woman
seeking an abortion must have the consent of her spouse,' and that an
unmarried woman under 18 must have the written consent of a parent or
person in loco parentis in order to obtain an abortion, unless a licensed
physician certified that the procedure was necessary to save her life.'
Also upheld by the district court were sections of the Act requiring a
woman's consent in writing and certified as "informed, freely given and not
the result of coercion";5 declaring the survivor of an attempted abortion an
abandoned ward of the state;6 prohibiting saline abortions after the first
trimester,' and sections prescribing certain record-keeping procedures., In
addition, the court upheld that section defining viability as a point at which
the fetus is "potentially able to live outside the mother's womb, albeit with
artificial aid," and is presumably capable of "meaningful life outside the
mother's womb" as being constitutional.'
On July 1, 1976, the United States Supreme Court, hearing the case
on appeal, reversed the district court's decision in part, declaring that
blanket provisions requiring parental consent for minors and spousal consent
I Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 392 F. Supp. 1362 (E.D. Mo. 1975).
2 1974 Mo. Laws 809 §6(1) (Amended House Bill No. 1211).
3 Id. §3(3).
4 Id. §3(4).
5 Id. §3(2).
61d. §7.
7 Id. §9.
8 Id. §§10,11.
9Id. §2(2).
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for married women seeking abortions are unconstitutional." In so doing,
the Court through Justice Blackmun spoke to questions it had specifically
reserved in its earlier decisions of Doe v. Bolton" and Roe v. Wade,1 in
which the woman's freedom to undergo an abortion during the first trimester
of pregnancy was upheld as against any state interests.' Also declared
unconstitutional was the prohibition against saline abortions.' In other
areas, the district court decision was affirmed."
The primary focus of this note deals only with the Court's reversal of
those sections requiring spousal and parental consent for abortion. The
Court's rejection of spousal and parental vetoes accords with its strong feel-
ing of protection of the privacy of the mother, as advocated in Roe. By its
action, the Court, although recognizing a valid interest on the part of the
husband in his wife's pregnancy and in the growth and development of the
fetus she is carrying, declined to allow the state to delegate to a spouse a
veto power which the state itself is absolutely denied during the first trimester
of pregnancy." In also declaring unconstitutional that section of the Act
requiring parental consent to an abortion," the Court held the pregnant
woman's right of privacy to be the paramount concern in the abortion
decision. 8
The plaintiffs who brought this action on their own behalf and pur-
portedly on behalf of all Missouri patients desiring abortions, and all physi-
cians who were performing or who desired to perform abortions within the
state, sought declaratory relief and asked that enforcement of the Act be
enjoined. Among the grounds for relief advanced were that certain provisions
of the Act deprived patients of various constitutional rights, including the
female patient's right to life which is affected by the risk inherent in child-
birth or in medical procedures alternative to abortion, and the patient's
fights under the Eighth Amendment to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment by forcing and coercing her to bear each child she conceives. "
The Court, having concluded in Roe v. Wade that the right of privacy
is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to term-
10 Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 96 S.Ct. 2831 (1976).
"1410 U.S. 179 (1973).
12 410 U.S. 113, 165 n. 67 (1973).
is Id. at 153.
14 96 S.Ct. at 2844-45.
"s Id. at 2846, 2848.
16Id. at 2841.
"7 1974 Mo. Laws 809 §3(4) (1974).
18 96 S.Ct. at 2844.
19 Id. at 2835-36.
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inate her pregnancy, 0 declined to hold this right absolute. Instead, the
Roe Court stated that the right must be considered against important state
interests in regulation,"' and the permissibility of state regulation varies over
the three stages of pregnancy, the first stage being pertinent to the present
decision. During this stage, prior to the end of the first trimester,22 the
abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the judgment of the
pregnant woman and her attending physician without interference from the
state.23
The Court has held that regulations limiting "fundamental rights" may
be justified only by a "compelling state interest","4 and that enactments
must be narrowly expressed to protect only legitimate state interests at stake.25
A legitimate state interest in this instance is the protection of the mother's
health, which becomes compelling subsequent to the first trimester. A second
legitimate state interest, the protection of potential life, occurs only at the
point of viability. Although the state has legitimate interests to protect which
grow substantially during a woman's pregnancy, these do not become
"compelling" until a time after the first trimester.2"
To justify a mandatory parental consent requirement during the first
trimester, the Court, to be consistent with Roe, would have had to find a
compelling state interest in preserving either the family unit or the integrity
of parental authority itself, which would be achieved through a parental
consent requirement. Likewise, to justify a spousal consent requirement, the
Court would have been forced to find (1) that the state had a compelling
interest in preserving the husband's interest during those early months, i.e.,
interest in the fetus and the procreative potential of the marriage, and
(2) that the interest would be preserved through required spousal consent.
Because, as indicated, the compelling state interest does not appear until
after the first trimester, in neither instance was the requisite state interest
found. Since the Court found that the state lacked veto power over abortions
20 410 U.S. at 153.
21 410 U.S. at 154.
22 A trimester is approximately three months.
23 410 U.S. at 164. After the first trimester, the State may if it chooses, reasonably regulate
the abortion procedure to preserve and protect maternal health. Finally, for the stage subse-
quent to viability, a point purposefully left flexible for professional determination, and de-
pendent upon developing medical skill and technical ability, the state may regulate an abortion
to protect the life of the fetus and even may proscribe abortion except where it is necessary,
in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother.
24 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406
(1963); Korematsu v. U.S. 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
25 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 460 (1972); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,
307 (1940). See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
28 410 U.S. at 162, 163.
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during the first trimester, it was therefore powerless to delegate veto power
to the spouse or the parents of the abortion candidate.2"
The Court's ruling in Danforth on parental consent poses a number
of immediate practical problems, particularly in states like Ohio, where
consensual abortion statutes similar to the one ruled unconstitutional in
Danforth are still in effect. Although spousal consent for abortion is not
required in Ohio, and direct statutory complications are thereby avoided,
the Danforth ruling on spousal consent presents an interesting framework
for analyzing the Court's willingness to balance the rights of husband and
wife.
SPOUSAL CONSENT
The Supreme Court has recognized that a right of personal privacy or
a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy does exist under the Con-
stitution.28 Personal rights that can be deemed "fundamental" or "implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty" are included within this guarantee of
personal liberty. 9 It is within this zone that the Court has placed one's right
to an abortion recognized in Roe, and the right of procreation first recognized
in Skinner v. Oklahoma."0
Thus, a purported interest of the spouse to be protected in granting
him the right to veto an abortion is his procreative right. However, in Skinner
the Court did not guarantee the individual a procreative opportunity; it
merely safeguarded his procreative potential from state infringement. In
contrast to this protection of procreative potential, the right of abortion
established by the Supreme Court in Roe is a very personal right exercised
by the woman as an individual. Therefore, protection of her partner's pro-
creative right does not permit state infringement upon the woman's funda-
mental right to abortion. 1
Although a man's procreative right cannot be held superior to a woman's
right to abort in a marriage relationship, an alternative could be made
available to insure a man his procreative potential. The Fifth Circuit Court
27 96 S.Ct. at 2841; 392 F. Supp. at 1375.
28 410 U.S. at 152.
29 Id.
30 316 U.S. 535 (1942). A statute of Oklahoma provided for the sterilization by vasectomy
or salpingectomy of "habitual criminals" defined therein. As applied to one who was con-
victed once of stealing chickens and twice of robbery, the Court held that the statute violated
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In their decision, the Court
recognized that marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival
of the race. Id. at 541. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). Cf. Buck v. Bell,
274 U.S. 200 (1927), where the Court found a Virginia statute providing for sexual sterili-
zation of inmates of institutions supported by the state, who shall be found to be afflicted
with an hereditary form of insanity or imbecility, to be within the power of the state.
P1 Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.gd 787, 796 (5th Cir. 1975).
[Vol. 10:2
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of Appeals has suggested that by making unconsented abortion a ground for
divorce," a man could have available a willing partner. By entering into a
new marriage relationship, the man could protect his procreative interests
without infringing upon the former wife's right to abortion,"3 there being
no viable alternative to secure the right of abortion.
A proposed second right of the spouse to be protected is his interest
in the unborn child. However, the common law recognized no recovery at
all for tortious injury to a fetus."4 Both the criminal law and tort law have
been reluctant to show a concern for protecting the father's interest in the
fetus. 5 In Kausz v. Ryan,"6 an action for the death of an unborn child, the
husband was denied recovery because the Court held both the existence of
any injury to the fetus and damages ensuing from such an injury to be too
speculative.
Basing the husband's interest in the fetus on his ultimate status as
father of the child, the Supreme Court has found that the husband may
establish a greater right than that of his wife to custody of the children
upon dissolution of marriage." ' However, his rights depend upon the ex-
istence of a family relationship, and since the fetus is not a person,8"
neither is it a child."9 Consequently, the father's interest in the fetus is not
equal to his interest in children with whom he has a familial relationship,
and therefore his interest in the fetus, besides being difficult to evaluate,
is not of sufficient magnitude to override the woman's decision to abort.
In light of the speculative nature of the husband's injury if the abortion
is allowed, and the substantial nature of the wife's injury if the abortion is
82 Id. The court referred to Kreyling v. Kreyling, 20 N.J. Misc. 52, 23 A.2d 800 (1942).
In that case a woman was granted a divorce on the grounds that her husband's refusal to
participate in uncontracepted intercourse was constructive desertion. The court found that
the husband's conduct frustrates one of the major purposes of marriage.
33 Id. at 797.
84 Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884); Drobner v. Peters, 232
N.Y. 220, 133 N.E. 567 (1921); Magnolia Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 124 Tex. 347,
78 S.W.2d 944 (1935). Contra, Stidam v. Ashmore, 109 Ohio App. 431, 167 N.E.2d 106
(1959) (admitted being minority view); Cooper v. Blanck, 39 So. 2d 352 (La. App. 1923)
(decided under civil law); Verkennes v. Cornelia, 38 N.W.2d 838 (Minn. 1949) (admitted
being minority view).
85 See Note, Abortion: The Father's Rights, 42 CIN. L. REv. 441, 442-44 (1973).
86 51 Iowa 232, 1 N.W. 485 (1879).
37 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
38 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 157, 158 (1973). In Roe the Court found that the Constitution
does not define "person" as such, however, its references are such that its use has application
only postnatally, with no assurances that it has any pre-natal application. By the Constitu-
tional references to "person" and also through the Court's recognition that throughout the
major part of the 19th century prevailing abortion practices were far freer than today, the
Court was persuaded that the word "person" as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, did not
include the unborn.
89 Poe v. Gernstein, 517 F.2d at 796.
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prohibited, such a consent requirement could operate to bar some women
from any opportunity to terminate a pregnancy unless the mother's health
is endangered. This could in essence operate as an interference on some
women comparable to those restrictions which anti-abortion statutes placed
on all women. "°
The Court found in Roe that maternity or additional offspring may
force upon the woman a distressful life and future. Psychological harm may
be impending, as well as the fact that mental and physical health may be
taxed by child care." A persuasive objection to interfering with a mother's
right to an abortion involves also the impact on the mental and physical
health of the child." Research indicates a link between unwanted pregnan-
cies and child abuse," and also reveals that children of unwilling mothers
have a higher incidence of criminal and antisocial behavior."' Since in our
society, care and continuing welfare of children usually are entrusted to
the mother,'" enforcement of spousal consent requirements, resulting in the
birth of children unwanted by the woman charged with their care, would
not only deprive the mother of her fundamental right of privacy, but could
also have detrimental effects upon the child.
In spite of the fact that the decision whether to forego an abortion may
have profound effects on the marital relationship as well as the mother/child
relationship, the Court still found the woman's interests to predominate.' 6
It again relied on the basic argument against state or spousal interference
with abortion during the first trimester of pregnancy.' 7
Although the Court recognized that the decision to terminate a preg-
nancy should be concurred in by both the wife and her husband, it found
difficulty in believing that the goal of fostering mutuality and trust in a
marriage or of strengthening the marriage relations would be achieved by
giving the husband a veto power exercisable for any reason or for no reason
at all.'3 Concentrating solely on the state's interest, the Court acknowledged
40See Poe v. Menghini, 339 F. Supp. 986 (D. Kan. 1972); United States v. Vutich, 305
F. Supp. 1032 (D.D.C. 1969).
4" 410 U.S. at 153.
42 Comment, Consent Provisions In Abortion Statutes, 1 FLA. ST. L. REv. 645, 658 n.102
(1973).
43 See Beck, Abortion: The Mental Health Consequences of Unwantedness, 2 SEMINARS
IN PSYCHIATRY (1970); R. GARDNER, ABORTION: THE PERSONAL DILEMMA 227 (1972);
Hardin, Abortion or Compulsory Pregnancy? 30 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. No. 2 (1968); Com-
ment, Consent Provisions in Abortion Statutes, 1 FLA. ST. L. REv. 645, 638 n.102 (1973).
44D. SCHULDER & F. KENNEDY, ABORTION RAP 130-39 (1971). See Beck, Abortion: The
Mental Health Consequences of Unwantedness, 2 SEMINARS IN PSYCHIATRY (1970).
45 Doe v. Doe, 314 N.E.2d 128, 139 (Mass. 1974).
46 96 S.Ct. at 2841.
47 Id. at 2842,
48 Id:
(Vol. 10:2
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the state's interest in preserving the rights of the father but felt by allowing
spousal consent requirements, the husband would be given a unilateral right
to prevent or veto an abortion, whether or not he was the father of the fetus.
Although the effect of a woman's option to secure an abortion without her
husband's consent can also be considered a unilateral decision, the Court
recognized the physical impact that childbearing has on her life."9 Therefore,
when the husband and wife disagree on the abortion decision, and no com-
promise is available, the immediate effect which a pregnancy has upon the
wife justifies her right as the one who can in effect act unilaterally.50
Justice Stewart's dissent in this case criticizes the Court's cursory treat-
ment of Section 3 (3) of the Act, which requires spousal consent, and
argues that the state is not delegating to the spouse the power to vindicate
its interest, but recognizes the husband's own interests which should not be
extinguished by the unilateral decision of the wife.5 A father's interest in
having a child-perhaps his only child-may be unmatched by any other
interest in his life.52 Recognizing marriage as an institution, any major change
in family status should be a decision made jointly by the marriage partners.
These are matters not to be decided by a federal judge but which the couple
should be free to decide.
In light of the Missouri Act, the Court could have found support for
the husband's consent claim in those "privacy" cases which have declared
as fundamental the right to marry,53 to establish a home and bring up chil-
dren,5" to procreate,55 and most recently the private interest of the man in
the children he has sired.56 Instead, the Court refused to recognize these
fundamental rights as being superior to that of the woman's to secure an
abortion, with the consent of her physician during the first trimester of
pregnancy.5" Under the Missouri Act, a woman must secure consent from
the man who is her husband at the time she desires the abortion, there
being no requirement that the woman be married at the time of conception,
and if married, to the same man whose consent is later required for the
abortion. There is no requirement that the husband even be the father of
the fetus, thereby basing the husband's interest in his marriage to the woman
rather than in the paternity of the fetus. Another problematic aspect of
491d.
50 Id., citing 410 U.S. at 153.
51 405 U.S. at 651.
52 96 S.Ct. at 2842.
53 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
54 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
55 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
56 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).
5 96 S.Ct. at 2841.
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spousal consent is that the husband's consent might be unobtainable because
he cannot be located, forcing an undue burden upon the mother.58
PARENTAL CONSENT PROVISION
In analyzing the Court's stance on abortions for minors without parental
consent, it must first be noted that the Missouri provision under scrutiny
was an absolute one,5" which stated that no abortion could be performed on
a minor during the first trimester without parental consent. Only thera-
peutic abortions were excepted. The Court referred to it as a "blanket"
parental consent requirement,6" one which amounted to a "veto power","1
and stated that "[t]he State does not have the constitutional authority to
give a third party an absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto over the decision
of the physician and his patient .... ",2
The Court, then, explicitly extended to unmarried minors the proposi-
tion expounded earlier in Roe, that a woman with her doctor has a funda-
mental right during the first trimester of pregnancy to make an abortion
decision without state interference. No compelling state interest toward
unmarried minors, such as preservation of the family unit, was found suffi-
cient to enable the state to interfere with that fundamental right. Still, the
Court upheld the Missouri statutory requirement that a woman herself must
give an informed consent in writing. The Court stressed that striking the
parental consent provision "does not suggest that every minor, regardless
of age or maturity, may give effective consent for termination of her preg-
nancy."63 Rather, the Court appears to be moving toward a sort of "mature-
minors" rule similar to that enacted for medical consent in Mississippi.6"
58 Id.
59 1974 Mo. Laws 809, §3, reads in part:
No abortion shall be performed prior to the end of the first twelve weeks of pregnancy
except: . . . (4) With the written consent of one parent in loco parentis of the woman
if the woman is unmarried and under the age of eighteen years, unless the abortion is
certified by a licensed physician as necessary in order to preserve the life of the mother.
60 96 S.Ct. at 2834 (1976) (syllabus 5).
61 Id. at 2844.
62 Id. at 2843
63 96 S.Ct. at 2844. Indeed, the record in the case at trial indicates that the executive director
of Reproductive Health Services, the major medical facility performing abortions in St. Louis,Mo., would weigh a number of personal factors in determining a minor's informed consent.
Judith Widdicombe testified that a girl's maturity, the level of her decision-making, her
ability to carry through with the abortion procedure, "extenuating circumstances," and educa-
tion and intelligence would all be considered in deciding whether a minor's consent to abortion
were sufficiently informed. Record at 152-53, as reported in Brief for Appellant as Amicus
Curiae (U.S. Catholic Conference), at 21-22.
64 Miss. CODE ANN. ch. 41, §41-3(h) (Lawyers Co-op. 1972) provides that any "unemanci-
pated minor of sufficient intelligence to understand and appreciate the consequences of the
proposed surgical or medical treatment or procedure may consent to such for himself." For
discussion of how mature minors provisions have become the most recent expansion of
[Vol. 10:2
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To evaluate the decision's precedential value for determining the con-
stitutionality of other less absolute abortion statutes dealing with parental
consent, it is necessary to examine the Court's opinion in Danforth's com-
panion case, Bellotti v. Baird.5
In that opinion, growing out of a class action against the Massachusetts
Attorney General by an abortion counseling organization and several un-
married pregnant women, the Supreme Court ruled that a 1974 Massa-
chusetts statute dealing with parental consent for abortions of unmarried
minors had been erroneously held unconstitutional by a three-judge district
court.8" The Supreme Court stated that the statute, providing for alternatives
in cases where consent is refused,"7 was a proper subject for abstention.68
Instead of ruling on constitutionality, the Court indicated that the district
court judges should have certified appropriate questions to the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court for interpretation concerning the statute's meaning
and attendant procedures so that a constitutional question could possibly be
avoided."9
Exactly what might constitute a constitutional procedure for obtaining
parental consent for abortions was not specified, but the Supreme Court
indicated that a federal constitutional challenge might be "avoided or sub-
stantially modified""0 if, as the appellants had indicated in their arguments,
the statute were interpreted by the state as one
.. that prefers parental consultation and consent, but permits a mature
minor capable of giving informed consent to obtain, without undue
burden, an order permitting the abortion without parental consultation,
and, further, permits even a minor incapable of giving informed consent
no-consent medical provisions for minors, see Pilpel, Minors' Rights to Medical Care, 36
ALB. L. REv. 462 (1972); Note, Parental Consent Requirements and Privacy Rights of
Minors: The Contraceptive Controversy, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1001 (1975).
G5 96 S.Ct. 2857 (1976).
66 Bellotti v. Baird, 393 F.Supp. 847 (D.C. Mass. 1975).
67 MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, §12(P) (West Supp. 1974) is applicable to non-emer-
gency abortions and provides in pertinent part: (1) If the mother is less than eighteen years
of age and has not married, the consent of both the mother and her parents is required. If
one or both of the mother's parents refuse such consent, consent may be obtained by order
of a judge of the superior court for good cause shown, after such hearing as he deems
necessary. Such a hearing will not require the appointment of a guardian for the mother.
If one of the parents has died or has deserted his or her family, consent by the remaining
parent is sufficient. If both parents have died or have deserted their family, consent of the
mother's guardian or other person having duties similar to a guardian, or any person who
had assumed the care and custody of the mother is sufficient.
68 96 S.Ct. at 2866.
89 Id. at 2867.
To 96 S.Ct. at 2866.
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to obtain an order without parental consultation where there is a
showing that the abortion would be in her best interests."'
Later in the Bellotti opinion, the Court noted that with minors,
. there are unquestionably greater risks of inability to give informed
consent."72 The clear implication is that a statute which provides for a hearing
before minors are allowed abortions without parental consent would probably
be upheld as constitutional, provided that the state court's interpretation
indicated that hearing procedures did not unduly burden minors in exercising
a fundamental right.
It does not appear likely that the Danforth decision signals a wholesale
change in the Court's historical attitude toward parental consent or that it
renders statutory consent provisions in other areas constitutionally suspect."8
The Court has consistently upheld the proposition that minors have certain
Constitutional rights." Earlier Court decisions, cited by appellee amici
briefs," which stressed the right of parents to exercise control over their
minor children, did not examine situations, such as abortion, in which
emotional conflicts between parents and children are likely. Rather, the
Court examined the power of the state in relation to desires apparently
shared by parents and their children."
Not all the Justices shared the view that the Court's historical attitude
toward parental consent has remained consistent in Danforth. Chief Justice
Burger, along with Justices Rehnquist and White, in an opinion concurring
in part and dissenting in part, suggested that Missouri is entitled to protect
a minor from making a decision not in her own best interests. In so doing
they pointed to examples, also offered by Justice Stevens in his dissenting
71 Id. at 2865.
72 Id. at 2866.
73 Dr. Eugene Diamond and Americans United for Life submitted an amicus curiae brieffor Appellant in which it is argued that if the Court strikes the Missouri parental consent
requirement, then other legislation to "protect the minor from the possible effects of herimmaturity" will become constitutionally suspect. Included in their predictions of jeopardizedlegislation are laws requiring parental consent for marriage, forbidding distribution of ob-
scene material to minors, prohibiting sale of liquor and tobacco, and making minors' con-
tracts voidable. Brief for Danforth Appellant at 94 (amicus curiae).
74 See, e.g., Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975) (right against double jeopardy is asserted);Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (confirming First and FourteenthAmendment rights for juveniles); In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (involving due process
rights in juvenile proceedings).
7 Amici briefs cited: Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); Pierce v. Society ofSisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925); In re Appeal in Maricopa County, I1l Ariz. 588, 536P.2d 197 (1975); Doe v. Planned Parenthood, 29 Utah 356, 410 P.2d 75 (1973), cert. denied
414 U.S. 805 (1973).
78 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (Amish children gave no indication
they resisted parents' restrictions on formal schooling beyond eighth grade); Pierce v.Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) Oregon (statute requiring public school attendance
was struck down with no demonstrated resistance by minors involved).
[V/ol. 10:2
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opinion,"7 of states protecting minors by not allowing them to make enforce-
able bargains, to marry without their parents' consent, to work or travel
wherever they please, or attend exhibitions of constitutionally protected adult
motion pictures."'
Additionally, Justice Stevens argued that a parental consent requirement
such as Missouri's would have the healthy effect of necessarily involving
parents in an important decision-making process. He noted:
It is unrealistic, in my judgment, to assume that every parent-child
relationship is either (a) so perfect that communication and accord
will take place routinely or (b) so imperfect that the absence of com-
munication reflects the child's correct prediction that the parent will
exercise his or her veto arbitrarily to further a selfish interest rather
than the child's interest."
Justices Stewart and Powell concurred in the majority opinion on all
issues. Concerning parental consent, Justice Stewart wrote that the Missouri
law's "primary constitutional deficiency lies in its imposition of an absolute
limitation on the minor's right to obtain an abortion."80
In support of the majority's reasoning, it should be noted that Supreme
Court cases cited by appellees, which indicate that states have broader
authority to protect children than adults,8 are not necessarily inconsistent
with the opinion in Danforth. Because of the physical and emotional trauma
attributed to unwanted teen-age pregnancy,82 it can be argued that in relaxing
consent requirements for abortion, the Supreme Court has allowed the
states once again the authority to protect minors-this time from arbitrary
parental vetoes.
PRACTICAL PROBLEMS IN OHIO
The implications of the ruling with respect to criminal and civil liability
7 96 S.Ct. at 2856.
78 However, the Court notes Appellants' argument that the Missouri statute does not require
parental consent for other medical services including care for pregnancy (excepting abortion),
venereal disease and drug abuse. Likewise, married minors need not obtain parental consent
to abort under Missouri law. 96 S.Ct. at 2843.
79 96 S.Ct. at 2857.
80 d. at 2851.
S1 See, e.g., Ginsberg v. N.Y., 390 U.S. 629, 636 (1968) (upholding statute forbidding dis-
tribution of obscene literature to minors, in which the Court expressly declined to extend
the holding to the "totality of the relationship of the minor and the state"); Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (upholding right of state to prohibit literature distribu-
tion by minors even where parents consented).
82 For discussion of high-risk pregnancies among teen-agers, see Note, The Minor's Right
to Abortion and the Requirement of Parental Consent, 60 VA. L. REv. 305, 307-8 (1974),
in which toxemia, maternal and infant mortality and infant brain damage are discussed, as
well as social problems of the pregnant school dropout and the resulting poverty cycle.
RECENT CASESFall,1976]
11
Long and Ravenscraft: Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkr n, 1977
AKRON LAW REVIEW
of physicians and medical facilities performing abortions would appear to
be an issue more serious than any philosophical shift by the Court.
In Ohio and a number of other states, the Court's decisions in Roe
and Doe meant not only the repeal of criminal abortion statutes but also
the hasty enactment of legislation to control abortion decisions and pro-
cedures within the new parameters set by the Court.8" Even before the
Danforth decision, lower courts had struck down as unconstitutional new
statutes requiring parental consent for abortion in a number of states.8"
Ohio's consensual abortion statute," similar to the Missouri statute
considered in Danforth, has been ruled unconstitutional by a three-judge
panel of the Northern District Court in Cleveland as a result of a suit filed
by the American Civil Liberties Union on behalf of two 17 year olds whose
parents refused to permit an abortion.8" Noting that the Ohio statute is
"inconsistent with the standards set forth in Danforth," the panel
permanently enjoined its enforcement."7 Like the Missouri statute, Ohio's
extended an absolute veto power to parents, and its repeal appears inevitable.
Unless it is replaced with a statute constitutionally acceptable within the
framework of the Bellotti decision, Ohio doctors and medical facilities are
without guidelines in determining whether the substantial number of their
abortion candidates, who are minors,8 have given an informed consent.
At least until new legislation is drafted, there are a number of factors
which might pressure doctors and medical facilities in Ohio toward a finding
83 Within 21 months after the Roe decision, 31 state legislatures had enacted 57 new laws
related to abortion and its regulation. Twelve states-Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massa-
chusetts, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina and
South Dakota-enacted legislation requiring some form of parental consent for minors.
3 FAM. PLANNING/Pop. REP. No. 5 at 90 (Oct. 1974).
84 Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787 (5th Cir. 1975); Doe v. Zimmerman, 405 F. Supp. 534
(M.D. Pa. 1975); Foe v. Vanderhoof, 389 F. Supp. 947 (D. Colo. 1975); Doe v. Rampton,
366 F. Supp. 189 (D.C. Utah 1973); Ballard v. Anderson, 4 Cal. 3d 873, 484 P.2d 1345,
95 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1971); In re Diane, 318 A.2d 629 (Del. Ch. 1974); Wolfe v. Schroering,
388 F. Supp. 631 (W.D. Ky. 1974).
In an interesting switch, the Court of Special Appeals for Maryland ruled in Matter of
Smith, 16 Md. App. 209, 295 A.2d 238 (1972) that a 16 year old could not be compelled
to have an abortion because her mother wanted her to have one.
85 OHIO REVISED CODE ANN. §2929.12 (Page Supp. 1975) states: (A) No person shall per-
form or induce an abortion without the informed consent of the pregnant woman. (B) If
the pregnant woman is an unmarried minor, the pregnant woman's consent must be accom-
panied by the informed consent of one of her parents or of her custodian or guardian.(C) Whoever violates this section is guilty of consensual abortion, a misdemeanor of the
first degree and for subsequent offenses, a felony of the fourth degree; and is liable to the
pregnant woman for civil compensatory and exemplary damages.
86 Hoe v. Brown, Civil No. 76-185 (N.D. Ohio, filed Aug. 31, 1976).
S7 Id. at 2.
88 Brief for Appellant at 96-97 indicated unmarried minors constituted 16.2 percent of all
abortions in New York City in 1971; 32.3 percent of California abortions in 1973; and
approximately 29 percent of all abortions performed in the combined states of Alaska,
Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, New York, Oregon and South Carolina during 1972.
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that a minor's consent to an elective abortion is not sufficiently "informed"
to proceed with the abortion, absent parental consent. The questionable
consensual abortion statute currently provides, as did the Court in Danforth,
that "informed" consent is required of any pregnant woman before an abor-
tion can be performed. That provision is constitutional by Danforth standards.
The doctor who does not receive informed consent can be found guilty under
the statute of a first-degree misdemeanor."9
Without any pre-abortion procedure, such as a court hearing, to deter-
mine whether a minor's consent is informed, the Ohio doctor must rely on
a court later in a possible criminal action to determine that his finding
that the minor's consent was informed was a reasonable one. Historically,
doctors faced with possible liability, have been found to "err toward con-
servatism."9
Besides being faced with possible criminal action, the Ohio doctor
who performs an abortion on a minor without parental consent under present
law may never be paid for his services. Contracts entered by minors in Ohio
are voidable and may be disaffirmed under both statute
9 and comman law 2
unless they are for items which a court rules to be "necessary"9 " or are
entered fraudulently by misrepresentation of age." Ohio laws allowing treat-
89 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §2929.12(c) (Page Supp. 1975). Interestingly, physicians who
might seek to verify their finding of informed consent by a minor abortion candidate will
not find an easy solution in a book of legal forms. Although the American Medical Asso-
ciation has issued suggested consent forms for the performance of an operation (15
AM. JuR. 2d LEGAL FORMS, Physicians and Surgeons §202:145 (1973)) and for the per-
formance of a therapeutic abortion (15 AM. JuR. 2d LEGAL FORMS, Physicians and Surgeons
§202:129 (1973)) no consent form for a non-therapeutic abortion is offered.
Indeed, the form book authors comment, "Due to recent court decisions, the law re-
garding abortions is not subject to coherent generalization, except that more restrictive
statutes appear for the present at least, to be of questionable validity. Due to this state of
flux in the law, the practitioner would be well advised to consult the most recent statutory
enactments and court decisions in all cases." (15 AM. JUR. 2d LEGAL FORMS, Physicians
and Surgeons §202:123 (1973)).
90 Stern, Medical Treatment and the Teenager: The Need For Parental Consent, 7 CLEAR-
INGHOUSE REV. 1, 4-5 (May 1973).
91 Omo REV. CODE ANN. §3109.01 (Page Supp. 1975).
92 For discussion on reason for common law requirement of parental consent to surgical
operations on minors, see Justice Hart's concurring opinion in Lacey v. Laird, 166 Ohio St.
12, 16-19 139 N.E.2d 25 (1956). In that case, the Ohio Supreme Court awarded nominal dam-
ages to a minor patient who had plastic surgery without her parents' consent.
93 See, e.g., Mestetzko v. Elf Motor Co., 119 Ohio St. 575, 165 N.E. 93 (1929) (auto sales
contracts entered by a minor fell within the rule for non-necessaries but were not subject
to voidability if the affirmative defense of fraud was successfully advanced); Lemmon v.
Beeman, 45 Ohio St. 505, 15 N.E. 476 (1888) (title to a stock of drugs, though subject to
the general voidability rule of minors' contracts for unnecessary items, was considered
restored to the vendor's estate when the minor-vendee disaffirmed the sales contract);
Morton v. Lutchin, 88 Ohio App. 75, 96 N.E.2d 784 (1950) (a contract for a new car, not
established as a "necessary," was considered subject to disaffirmance).
04 In Haydocy Pontiac Inc. v. Lee, 19 Ohio App. 2d 717, 250 N.E.2d 898 (1969), a car
dealer, faced with default by a minor purchaser, was allowed to recover fair property value
because the minor had misrepresented his age.
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ment for minors without parental consent for drug abuse' and venereal
disease"6 both specially stipulate that a minor cannot later disaffirm his
personal consent on account of minority. They also indicate that his parent,
parents, or guardian may not be held liable for medical diagnosis or treat-
ment if they did not consent. The implication is that medical contracts
entered into by minors without their parents' consent must be statutorily
protected or the contracts will be voidable.
Similarly, it is questionable whether a married woman of majority
may hold her husband to any financial obligations she has incurred in having
an abortion performed without his consent. Although she may not personally
disaffirm the contract, as may a minor, her husband under Ohio law is only
liable for "necessaries for her support." 7 An elective abortion is arguably
not a necessary. In situations where the woman is not able to pay for her
own abortion, a doctor may not be able to collect from her unconsenting
spouse.
An additional complication, possible withholding of Medicaid benefits,
could mean that doctors and medical facilities in Ohio would encounter even
greater financial difficulties than those in other states. Although most states
allow the expenditure of Medicaid funds for abortions by eligible patients, 8
and have extended that eligibility to minors, Ohio currently has a statutory
prohibition against spending such funds for an abortion unless it is "necessary
to preserve the life or physical or mental health of the pregnant woman."' 0
Although the statute is currently not being enforced, pending a decision on
its constitutionality,"' it is possible that Ohio women who desire elective
"5 Omo REV. CODE ANN. §3719.012 (Page Supp. 1975).
96 OIo REV. CODE ANN. §3709.241 (Page Supp. 1975).
97 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §3103.03 (Page Supp. 1975) states in pertinent part: 'The husband
must support himself, his wife, and his minor children out of his property or by his labor.
If he is unable to do so, the wife must assist him so far as she is able .... If he neglects
to support his wife, any other person, in good faith, may supply her with necessaries forher support, and recover the reasonable value thereof from the husband unless she abandons
him without cause."
98 Analysis, Medicaid Pays for Abortion in Most States, 5 FAM. PLANNING/Pop. REP. No. 1
at 11 (Feb. 1976).
90Title XIX, SOCIAL SECURrrY ACT § 1905(a) (4) was amended in 1972 to require states to
make family planning services available to minors of childbearing age. Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare. FAMILY PLANNING, CONTRACEPTION AND VOLUNTARY
STERILIZATION: AN ANALYSIS OF LAWS AND POLICIES IN THE U.S., EACH STATE AND JURIS-
DICTION 70 (Pub. No. (HSA) 74-16001, 1974).
10 OHno REV. CODE ANN. §5101.55(c) (Page Supp. 1975).
101 Briefs and stipulations have been filed but as yet no decision has been reached by a
three-judge panel convened by the U.S. District Court for Southern Ohio, to consider the
statute's constitutionality. The Southern District had originally found the statute invalid as
conflicting with the Social Security Act and ordered payments made. Roe v. Ferguson, 389F. Supp. 387 (S.D. Ohio 1974). The Sixth Circuit, on appeal, found the laws consistent but
remanded the constitutional question to the three-judge panel where it is now pending.
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abortions and are economically eligible for Medicaid benefits will face a
funds cut-off.1 2 In such case, Ohio minors would be in the difficult position
of neither being able to contract privately for abortion services without their
parents' consent nor to rely on public funding.
CONCLUSION
While not a radical departure from other U.S. and lower court decisions
dealing with parental and spousal consent issues, the Danforth decision may
present problems in the future.
The consequences of this decision beyond the single pregnancy if the
wife chooses to abort without her husband's consent could be to effectively
prevent her husband from having any children. An alternative could be to
allow the unconsented abortion, but assure the husband of an evidentiary
basis for divorce.1"' In addition, if a wife chooses to exercise her right to an
abortion against her husband's will, and is unable to pay the expenses in-
volved, her husband may become liable for the costs incurred. Although
in Ohio, the husband is only liable for "necessaries for her support", one
might argue that such an abortion could in some instances be found to be
such a necessary. If not so found, and the wife is unable to pay, the doctor
cannot collect from her spouse, and may be unable to recover for his
services.
In the instant case, the Court has limited its decision to that stage of
the pregnancy where the fetus is not viable, thus permitting speculation that
a different ruling could be forthcoming for the spouse during the second
trimester. However, because the state has no interest to protect during the
first trimester and therefore none to delegate to the spouse,' those states with
spousal consent statutes will be forced to declare them invalid and attempt
to protect the spouse's interest in another manner.
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth and its companion case, Bellotti v.
Baird present perhaps their greatest challenge to legislatures in states like
Roe v. Ferguson, 515 F.2d 279 (6th Cir. 1975). Currently in effect is a temporary restrain-
ing order to continue Medicaid payments pending the panel's decision. Roe v. Ferguson,
No. 74-315 (S.D. Ohio July 14, 1975). At least two states have appealed similar orders,
which mandated public fund expenditure for elective abortions, to the U.S. Supreme Court.
Maher v. Roe, No. 75-1440, 44 U.S.L.W. 3761 (appeal filed April 4, 1976), 45 U.S.L.W.
3062 (prob. juris. noted July 6, 1976) (appealing order of U.S. District Court for Connecti-
cut that welfare recipients be reimbursed for elective abortions); Toia v. Klein, No. 75-1749,
45 U.S.L.W. 3069 (appeal filed June 2, 1976) (appealing order of U.S. District Court
for Eastern New York that indigents receive Medicaid funds for elective abortions).
102 Neither must a corporation provide insurance coverage for pregnancy-related disabilities.
General Electric v. Gilbert, 45 U.S.L.W. 4031 (Dec. 7, 1976).
103 Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787, 796 (5th Cir. 1975).
104 96 S.Ct. at 2841.
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Ohio, where existing parental consent abortion statutes have been clearly
outlawed by their holdings. The Court in Bellotti indicates that certain
guidelines, such as a court hearing, for determining a minor's informed
consent may be acceptable, so long as they are not unduly burdensome. It
appears clearly that they should be adopted so as to maximize the freedom
with which doctors can proceed without threat of criminal liability.
Similarly, in Ohio, a newly-enacted statute dealing with abortions
should contain provisions similar to those now effective in venereal and
drug abuse statutes, to prevent a minor from disaffirming his informed
consent and voiding his contract. Until these steps are taken, in Ohio, at
least, the parental veto on minors who seek abortions without their parental
consent may be replaced with an equally burdensome economic veto. If
this is so, the spirit of the Danforth decision will not have been achieved.
SHARON L. LONG
PATRICIA RAVENSCRAFT
DOMESTIC RELATIONS
Divorce and Alimony • Separation Agreements e Jurisdiction of Court
to Modify o Impairment of Contract o Statutory Provisions
Wolfe v. Wolfe, 46 Ohio St. 2d 399, 350 N.E.2d 413 (1976).
W ITH THE decision of Wolfe v. Wolfe 1 the Ohio Supreme Court joins
the majority of American jurisdictions' which hold that where a court
has the general power to modify a decree for alimony or support3 the exercise
1 46 Ohio St. 2d 399, 350 N.E.2d 413 (1976).
2 See, e.g., Levitt v. Levitt, 62 Cal. 2d 477, 399 P.2d 33, 42 Cal. Rptr. 577 (1965); Bowman
v. Bowman, 11 I11. App. 3d 719, 298 N.E.2d 339 (1973); Heinmuller v. Heinmuller, 257
Md. 672, 264 A.2d 847 (1970); Lytle v. Lytle, 357 Mich. 676, 99 N.W.2d 377 (1959);
Berkowitz v. Berkowitz, 55 N.J. 564, 264 A.2d 49 (1970); Goldman v. Goldman, 282 N.Y.
296, 26 N.E.2d 265 (1940); Kinne v. Kinne, 82 Wash. 2d 360, 510 P.2d 814 (1973).
3For the purposes of modification, the Court in Wolfe drew the distinction between alimony
as an award for the support of the spouse and the property settlement, the latter remaining
beyond the power of the Court to modify. 46 Ohio St. 2d at 418, 350 N.E.2d at 425. See note
18 infra. The Court noted that although the legislature has failed to give a clear definition
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